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Foreword	to	the	first	issue	of	the	WMU	Papers	on	Maritime	and	Ocean	Affairs	World	 Maritime	 University	 (WMU)	 was	 founded	 almost	 35	 years	 ago	 in	 an	 effort	 of	 the	 International	Maritime	Organization	(IMO)	to	establish	an	institution	for	further	education	of	future	maritime	and	ocean	leaders	as	well	as	a	centre	of	excellence	in	research	dedicated	to	maritime	and	ocean	matters.	A	major	task	for	WMU	has	been	 capacity	building,	primarily	 for	developing	 countries.	However,	we	have	also	 seen	a	growing	interest	in	sharing	maritime	and	ocean-related	knowledge	and	experience	for	developed	countries.	This	is	the	reason	for	WMU’s	academic	Journal	and	Book	Series,	which	is	a	means	to	facilitate	discussions	on	 contemporary	 issues	 in	 the	 maritime	 and	 ocean-related	 fields.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 we	 have	 taken	cognizance,	during	the	many	missions	that	WMU	has	carried	out	over	the	years,	of	the	need	for	practical	guidance	and	the	sharing	good	practice	among	IMO	member	States.	This	experience	gave	birth	to	the	idea	of	a	technical	paper	series.		I	am	delighted	to	present	the	first	paper	in	this	new	series	about	the	TRACEr	methodology	adapted	in	the	maritime	context.	This	is	a	guidebook	for	interested	parties	involved	in	maritime	accident	investigations	and	 technical	 risk	 assessments	 who	 may	 be	 interested	 in	 making	 use	 of	 this	 methodology.	 With	 this	guidebook,	 we	 have	 tried	 to	 facilitate	 the	work	 of	 our	 parent	 organization,	 the	 International	Maritime	Organization	(IMO)	and	support	the	considerable	efforts	it	has	made	and	continues	to	make	to	raise	the	profile	of	accident	investigation	as	a	core	responsibility	for	member	States.	This	would	also	help	to	improve	the	outcome	of	such	investigations	for	the	benefit	of	the	wider	maritime	and	ocean	community	at	large.	By	making	 the	new	paper	 series	of	WMU	available	 in	electronic	 format	 that	 can	be	downloaded	 free	of	charge	 and	 easily	 distributed,	 we	 hope	 to	 facilitate	 the	 efforts	 of	 IMO	 in	 areas	 related	 to	 technical	cooperation.	At	the	same	time,	 it	 is	 intended	to	be	a	small	contribution	from	WMU	in	support	of	the	UN	Sustainability	Goals	4	and	14,	by	promoting	life-long	learning,	increased	maritime	safety	and	contribute	to	the	sustainability	of	life	below	water.			I	hope	the	new	paper	series	is	well	received	by	our	global	community	of	stakeholders	and	look	forward	to	many	more	papers	that	will	address	vital	maritime	and	ocean	issues.		
Dr.	Cleopatra	Doumbia-Henry	President	World	Maritime	University	
	
About	this	guidebook:	This	 guidebook	 is	 the	 first	 of	 a	 series	 of	 WMU	Papers	 in	 Maritime	 and	 Ocean	 Affairs.	 It	introduces	 the	 Human	 Error	 Identification	technique	 TRACEr-Mar	 (Technique	 for	 the	
Retrospective	 and	 predictive	 Analysis	 of	
Cognitive	 Errors	 adapted	 to	 the	 Maritime	Domain.		Modern	socio-technical	systems	had	witnessed	a	complex	 co-evolution	 and	 interaction	 of	 both	social	 and	 technical	 aspects	 in	 the	 day-to-day	reality.	However,	when	an	accident	occurs	in	such	complex	 systems,	 accident	 causation	 models	always	 have	 to	 simplify	 the	 reality	 and	 may	therefore	 be	 limited	 for	 fully	 understanding	 all	the	aspects	involved	in	the	failing	of	the	maritime	socio-technical	system	involved	in	that	accident.	In	 order	 to	 carry	 out	 an	 accident	 investigation	that	covers	the	needs	of	a	particular	investigator,	different	 tools	 exist.	 A	 systematic	 accident	analysis	 requires	 a	 full	 methodological	framework	consisting	of	a	model	to	support	the	focus	 of	 the	 investigation,	 a	 related	 data	taxonomy,	 a	methodology	 for	 the	 application	of	the	taxonomy	and	an	outline	of	the	analysis	of	the	findings.	This	guidebook	provides	the	necessary	information	for	such	a	framework,	TRACEr-Mar,	as	 adapted	 to	 the	 Maritime	 domain.	 This	framework	 focusses	 on	 human	 machine	interfaces	and	the	related	decision	making	during	maritime	operations.		The	guidebook	is	addressed	to	practitioners	and	researchers	 determined	 to	 apply	 the	 TRACEr-Mar	 technique	 to	 maritime	 accident	investigations.			
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FOREWORD	Core	tasks	of	maritime	administrations	relate	to	the	implementation	and	enforcement	of	maritime	safety	standards	on	board	ships	and	in	shipping	companies.	In	this	respect,	accidents	could	be	an	indicator	for	insufficient	regulations	or	ineffective	enforcement	provisions.	Thorough	accident	investigation	is	therefore	an	important	mandate	for	maritime	administrations	in	order	to	identify	ways	to	improve	the	overall	safety	performance	of	the	fleet	in	an	International	Maritime	Organization	(IMO)	member	state.		The	Maritime	Risk	and	System	Safety	(MaRiSa)	Group	at	World	Maritime	University	(WMU)	has	applied	a	number	 of	 accident	 causation	 models	 and	 models	 used	 for	 the	 analysis	 of	 single	 aspects	 of	 system	performance	during	different	studies	in	recent	years.	As	part	of	this	new	WMU	series	of	reports,	the	MaRiSa	group	will	introduce	some	of	these	models,	taxonomies	and	methodologies	to	demonstrate	the	potential	that	 systematic	 application	 of	 an	 analytical	 framework	 for	 accident	 analysis	 offers	 for	 accident	investigation	bodies	and	ultimately	increased	maritime	safety.	This	 first	 paper	 is	 dedicated	 to	 the	 analytical	 framework	 of	 the	 Technique	 for	 the	Retrospective	 and	predictive	Analysis	of	Cognitive	Errors	(TRACEr).	TRACEr	was	developed	with	a	specific	focus	on	air	traffic	control	as	a	retrospective	incident	analysis	technique	and	as	a	predictive	human	error	identification	tool	(Shorrock	&	Kirwan	2002).	TRACEr	 focusses	on	 the	human-machine	 interface	 (HMI)	 and	 suggests	 that	incidents	 are	 often	 triggered	 by	 underlying	 cognitive	 and	 psychological	 processes	 that	 affect	 the	performance	 of	 an	 operator.	 TRACEr	 consists	 of	 a	 modular	 structure	 comprising	 eight	 inter-related	taxonomies.	The	core	of	the	TRACEr	methodology	is	the	operator’s	cognitive	process	and	the	environment	in	which	the	operator	carries	out	a	task.	The	TRACEr	taxonomy	could	be	used	to	categorise	the	findings	of	the	analysis	of	 individual	 incident	and	accident	 reports	as	well	 as	questionnaires,	 interviews	and	other	observations.	In	order	to	be	used	in	the	maritime	context,	TRACEr	needed	to	be	adapted	accordingly.	This	adaptation	was	called	TRACEr-Mar	and	developed	and	used	in	the	EU	financed	CyClaDes	project.	This	guidebook	introduces	the	TRACEr-Mar	framework	and	will	aid	the	practitioner	in	applying	TRACEr-Mar	for	the	retrospective	analysis	of	maritime	accidents.		 	
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1. BACKGROUND	TO	TRACER-MAR		 Core	tasks	of	maritime	administrations	relate	to	the	implementation	and	enforcement	of	maritime	safety	standards	on	board	ships	and	in	shipping	companies.	In	this	respect,	accidents	could	be	an	indicator	for	insufficient	regulations	or	ineffective	enforcement	provisions.	Thorough	accident	investigation	is	therefore	an	important	mandate	for	maritime	administrations	in	order	to	identify	ways	to	improve	the	overall	safety	performance	of	the	fleet	in	an	International	Maritime	Organization	(IMO)	member	state.		In	its	specific	guidelines	the	IMO	highlights	the	safety	aspects	in	accident	investigations.	This	means	that	safety	investigations	carried	out	by	maritime	administrations	should	not	have	the	objective	of	establishing	individual	 liability.	 Instead,	such	 investigations	are	supposed	to	 identify	 factors	that	systematically	may	lead	to	accidents.	In	order	to	deliver	on	this	task,	a	high	degree	of	harmonization	in	accident	investigation	procedures	is	a	pre-requisite.	Without	guidelines	individual	investigators	may	randomly	highlight	different	factors	that	culminate	in	the	accident.	This	could	lead	to	a	situation	where	the	results	of	such	investigations	cannot	be	used	for	statistics	and	trend	analysis.	Therefore,	a	tool	is	needed	to	set	a	baseline	or	standard	in	investigations	that	would	allow	different	investigators	to	focus	on	similar	issues	and	harmonise	the	focus	and	outcome	of	these	investigations.	Modern	 socio-technical	 systems,	 which	 witness	 the	 co-evolution	 and	 interaction	 of	 both	 social	 and	technical	 aspects	 (Geels,	 2004),	 are	highly	 complex,	 no	 less	 in	 the	maritime	 sector.	 	However,	 accident	causation	 models	 always	 simplify	 the	 reality	 to	 a	 certain	 extent	 and	 may	 be	 inadequate	 for	 fully	understanding	the	complexity	of	maritime	socio-technical	systems.	While	many	accident	causation	models	cannot	be	used	for	modelling	and	analysing	an	entire	socio-technical	system,	they	may	be	able	to	focus	on	single	aspects	of	the	overall	system	performance.	This	is	the	reason	why,	over	the	years,	so	many	different	accident	causation	models	and	models	of	single	aspects	in	socio-technical	systems	were	developed.	A	systematic	accident	analysis	requires	a	full	methodological	framework	consisting	of	a	model	to	support	the	focus	of	the	investigation,	a	related	data	taxonomy,	a	methodology	for	the	application	of	the	taxonomy	and	an	outline	of	the	analysis	of	the	findings	(Figure	1).	This	guidebook	provides	the	necessary	information	for	 such	 a	 framework,	 TRACEr-Mar,	 the	 Technique	 for	 the	 Retrospective	 and	 predictive	 Analysis	 of	
Cognitive	Errors	(TRACEr)	as	adapted	to	the	Maritime	domain.			The	first	part	of	this	guidebook	sets	out	the	background	of	TRACEr-Mar	and	includes	a	discussion	of	 its	strengths	 and	 weaknesses.	 The	 second	 part	 introduces	 the	 methodology	 for	 using	 TRACEr-Mar	 and	includes	 comments	on	 the	validity	 and	 reliability	of	 the	method.	 In	 the	 third	part,	 the	 full	 taxonomy	 is	provided,	which	in	combination	with	the	methodology,	allows	the	coding	of	accidents	using	TRACEr-Mar.		The	guidebook	concludes	with	a	commented	application	example,	where	an	accident	was	analysed	and	relevant	events	were	coded.	This	example	will	help	an	inexperienced	user	to	become	more	familiar	with	the	application	of	the	TRACEr-Mar	framework.			
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Figure	1:	Framework	for	casualty	investigation	(Schröder-Hinrichs,	2003	on	the	basis	of	Hollnagel,	1998)	1.1	WHAT	IS 	TRACER	ABOUT?	In	the	past,	human	error	has	been	held	accountable	for	a	 large	percentage	of	accidents,	 including	in	the	maritime	domain	(Donaldson,	1994).	The	reduction	of	human	error	is	a	key	end	goal	of	human	reliability	analysis	 (HRA)	 as	 it	 enables	 practitioners	 to	 assess	 and	 enhance	 the	 reliability	 of	 human	 operators	 by	reducing	the	likelihood	of	errors	that	can	occur	(Kirwan,	1994).	HRA	has	three	main	steps:	human	error	identification	(HEI),	in	which	the	errors	that	can	occur	are	identified;	human	error	quantification,	in	which	the	probability/likelihood	of	the	errors	is	quantified;	and	human	error	reduction,	in	which	the	likelihood	of	the	errors	is	reduced	by	taking	appropriate	measures	(Kirwan,	1994).		The	Technique	for	the	Retrospective	and	predictive	Analysis	of	Cognitive	Errors	(TRACEr)	is	a	methodology	that	 facilitates	 the	 identification	 and	 classification	 of	 human	 errors	 in	 relation	 to	 human-machine	interaction	(HMI).	TRACEr	is	an	HEI	method	and	the	premise	of	HEI	is	that	if	one	has	an	understanding	of	the	task	and	the	technology	with	which	it	is	to	be	performed	(the	HMI),	one	can	identify	the	probable	errors	that	can	occur	(Stanton,	Salmon,	&	Rafferty,	2013).	TRACEr	was	primarily	developed	for	air	traffic	control	(ATC)	by	Shorrock	and	Kirwan	(2002)	as	a	domain	specific	tool	for	HEI.	The	need	for	a	classification	system,	specific	to	ATC	had	been	identified	earlier	in	a	feasibility	study	(Evans	et	al.,	1998),	and	TRACEr	fulfilled	this	 vital	 need.	 For	 the	developers	 of	TRACEr,	 error	 analysis	 is	 essential	 for	 safety	management,	 and	 a	meaningful	classification	of	errors	 is	required	to	detect	 trends	 in	 incidents	and	to	 identify	 the	probable	ways	 a	 system	 could	 fail	 (Shorrock	 and	 Kirwan,	 2002).	 Therefore,	 TRACEr	 was	 developed	 as	 a	comprehensive	technique	for	error	classification	specific	to	ATC.		TRACEr	embodies	the	Janus’	perspective	(Shorrock	and	Kirwan,	2002).	The	Roman	deity	Janus	presides	over	beginnings	and	transitions	and	is	depicted	with	two	faces,	looking	forward	into	the	future	and	looking	back	at	the	bygone	past.		In	a	similar	vein,	TRACEr	allows	for	the	identification	of	errors	in	a	predictive	as	well	 as	 retrospective	 capacity.	 For	 the	 forward	 looking	 predictive	 application	 of	 TRACEr,	 the	 reader	 is	referred	to	Shorrock	and	Kirwan	(2002).	Their	paper	focuses	on	the	retrospective	application	of	TRACEr	for	the	purpose	of	 incident	analysis	to	classify	operator	errors	and	to	identify	patterns	in	incidents	that	contribute	to	error	reduction	and/or	mitigation.		TRACEr	was	developed	iteratively	and	was	based	on	expert	interviews,	accident	analysis	and	a	review	of	HEI	literature,	among	others	(Shorrock	and	Kirwan,	2002).	TRACEr	focuses	on	HMI	and	a	comprehensive	analysis	of	errors	by	operators	in	accidents.	TRACEr	adds	to	the	knowledge	about	errors	and	their	context	and	provides	empirical	evidence	to	nuance	human	error.	TRACEr	focusses	on	operator-machine	interaction	and	 suggests	 that	 incidents	 are	 often	 triggered	 by	 cognitive	 and	 psychological	 errors	 by	 the	 operator.	External	and	internal	factors	also	influence	the	operator’s	performance.		
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TRACEr	consists	of	a	modular	structure	comprising	eight	inter-related	taxonomies.	These	taxonomies	can	be	divided	into	those	that	describe	the	context	of	the	incident,	those	that	describe	the	cognitive	background	of	the	production	of	an	error	and	those	relating	to	incident	recovery.	The	context	of	the	error	is	captured	by	 the	Task	Error,	 Information	 and	Performance	Shaping	Factors	 (PSF)	 taxonomies.	Error	production	 is	classified	within	TRACEr	utilising	external	error	modes	(EEMs),	cognitive	framework,	internal	error	modes	(IEMs),	psychological	error	mechanisms	(PEMs)	and	error	detection	and	correction	(Shorrock	and	Kirwan,	2002).	These	taxonomies	are	discussed	in-depth	in	chapter	3.	1.2	COGNITIVE	MODELS	UNDERLYING	TRACER	A	model	or	framework	to	support	and	inform	accurate	error	classification	with	the	help	of	a	taxonomy	is	extremely	important	(Figure	1).	Shorrock	and	Kirwan	(2002)	considered	several	cognitive	frameworks	and	models	of	task	performance	and	human	error	in	the	development	of	TRACEr.	The	simple	model	of	cognition	(SMoC)	by	Hollnagel	(1998)	(Figure	2)	and	Wickens’	(as	cited	by	Liebl	et	al.,	2011)	framework	(Figure	3)	were	found	to	be	the	most	suitable	for	developing	the	cognitive	framework	for	TRACEr.		SMoC	emphasises	the	cyclical	nature	of	cognition	(Figure	2).	Wickens’	framework	(Figure	3)	shows	that	the	stimulus	 need	 not	 necessarily	 start	 the	 information	 flow	 and	 that	 the	working	memory	 can	 internally	trigger	operator	decisions	and/or	responses.	Furthermore,	the	flow	of	 information	need	not	necessarily	progress	sequentially	through	the	perception,	cognition	and	action	stages.	Instead,	the	long-term	memory	can	 directly	 trigger	 cognition	 and	 (re)action,	 thereby	 shortening	 the	 flow	 of	 information,	 if	 required.	Together	these	two	models	highlight	the	internal	mental	processes	that	shape	cognitive	errors	and	formed	the	basis	of	 the	cognitive	 framework	which	helps	to	organise	IEMs	and	PEMs	in	TRACEr	(Shorrock	and	Kirwan,	2002).			
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	
Figure	2:	Simple	model	of	cognition	(adapted	from	Hollnagel,	1998)	
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Figure	3:	Approach	to	information	processing	(adapted	from	Wickens	as	cited	by	Liebl,	et	al.,	2011)	1.3	THE	TRACER-MAR	FRAMEWORK	Since	TRACEr	was	originally	developed	 for	 the	application	 in	aviation	with	a	 focus	on	ATC,	 it	could	not	directly	be	applied	in	the	maritime	domain	and	needed	to	be	adapted	to	the	maritime	context.	The	resulting	domain	specific	application	was	called	TRACEr-Mar.		Figure	4	sets	out	the	applied	TRACEr	framework	as	adapted	to	the	maritime	domain.	In	principle,	two	types	of	adaptions	were	made	in	TRACEr-Mar	(Schröder-Hinrichs	et	al.,	2016).	The	first	adaptation	relates	to	bringing	the	ship-system	into	the	coding	structure	in	order	to	enable	coders	to	portray	its	complex	operations,	locations	and	personnel.	The	second	adaptation	mainly	relates	to	the	production	of	the	 error.	 Changes	made	 within	 this	 aspect	 were	 deemed	 necessary	 to	 enrich	 the	 outcome	 of	 further	analyses.	1.3.1	INTRODUCING	THE	SHIP 	AS 	A 	SOCIO-TECHNICAL	SYSTEM	The	most	 significant	 variation	 to	TRACEr	was	made	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 coding	 of	 the	 task	 errors	 and	 to	portraying	 the	 social	 and	 technical	 complexity	 of	 the	 vessel.	 TRACEr-Mar	 had	 to	 consider	 multiple	operators	 in	 various	 locations	 involved	 in	 different	 operational	 tasks.	 TRACEr-Mar	 categorizes	 four	different	locations	(bridge,	deck,	engine	(control)	room	and	others)	and	adds	contextual	information	to	the	erroneous	task	(error	information).	The	additional	error	information	relates	to	the	technical	equipment	used	by	an	operator	(e.g.,	radar,	ECDIS,	VHF,	etc.)	and	enhances	the	focus	on	HMI.	In	addition,	an	option	to	specify	subtasks	to	add	clarity,	where	appropriate,	is	given.	This	provides	a	more	substantial	description	of	the	task	error.			
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1.3.2	ENHANCING	THE	OUTCOME	OF 	FURTHER	ANALYSES	In	order	to	support	databases	and	analyses,	a	table	containing	fixed	information	(such	as	size,	dimension,	etc.)	and	variable	information	(such	as	draught,	trim,	etc.)	about	the	ship	under	consideration	was	added.	In	addition,	a	table	with	a	causality	 level	was	 included.	The	determination	of	the	causality	 level	(causal,	contributory,	compounding,	or	non-contributory)	of	a	task	error	should	enhance	the	analytical	strength	of	TRACEr-Mar.	Another	 adaptation	 pertains	 to	 the	 error	 recovery.	 A	 table	 was	 added	 specifying	 barriers	 (physical,	functional,	symbolic,	or	incorporeal)	that	were	intended	to	prevent	the	task	error.	The	main	aim	of	physical	or	material	barriers	is	to	protect	personnel	and	the	vessel	by	blocking	or	mitigating	the	effects	of	the	task	error	 (e.g.,	 walls,	 doors,	 helmets,	 etc.).	 Functional	 barrier	 systems	 (e.g.,	 locks,	 passwords,	 distance,	sprinklers,	firefighting,	etc.),	in	most	cases,	only	work	if	they	are	combined	with	physical	barrier	systems.	They	 only	 come	 into	 operation	when	 a	 specific	 condition	 exists.	 A	 symbolic	 barrier	 system	 (e.g.,	 sign,	signals,	 instructions,	 procedures,	 demarcations,	 etc.)	 works	 indirectly	 through	 its	 meaning	 and	 hence	requires	an	act	of	interpretation	by	someone.	An	incorporeal	barrier	system	(e.g.,	informal	guidance,	formal	guidance,	rules,	restrictions,	etc.)	lacks	material	form	or	substance	in	the	situations	where	it	is	applied	and	instead	depends	on	the	user	to	apply	it	in	order	to	achieve	its	purpose.	Although	the	original	TRACEr	taxonomy	considered	error	recovery,	it	did	not	define	a	coding	structure	for	this	element	of	 the	 technique.	The	barrier	concept	 for	error	 recovery	 is	also	 intended	 to	add	analytical	strength	to	the	technique.		
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Figure	4:	Applied	TRACEr	framework	adapted	to	the	maritime	domain	(adapted	from	Shorrock	and	Kirwan,	2002)			
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2. TRACER-MAR	METHODOLOGY		 This	chapter	provides	an	overview	of	the	TRACEr-Mar	application	methodology	and	discusses	the	issue	of	inter-rater	reliability.	The	chapter	concludes	with	an	assessment	of	the	advantages	and	disadvantages	of	TRACEr-Mar.	2.1	STEPS	FOR	THE	CODING	AND	ANALYSIS	OF	MARITIME	ACCIDENTS	WITH	TRACER-MAR	The	TRACEr-Mar	application	process	has	three	main	aspects	–	data	collection,	coding	with	TRACEr-Mar	and	data	analysis	(adapted	from	Walker	et	al.,	2012).	
• Data	collection	
- Detailed	data	should	be	collected	with	respect	to	the	incident(s)	to	be	analysed.	This	can	include	investigation	reports,	video	recordings	of	incident,	and	interviews	with	involved	personnel.	When	more	than	once	incident	has	to	be	analysed,	databases	can	be	mined	and,	if	required,	data	sets	can	be	combined.	
• Data	coding	
- General	information:	Details	of	the	ship	(name,	IMO	number,	type,	size	and	age	of	vessel),	details	of	incident	(where,	when,	type	and	severity	of	incident)	and	where	on	the	vessel	the	error	was	performed	that	led	to	the	incident.	
- Task	error:	Who	performed	the	erroneous	action?	What	task	was	performed	wrongly?		
- Error	information:	Which	equipment	was	involved	in	the	error?	Which	specific	task	was	performed	wrongly?	What	information	concerning	the	vessel	was	not	taken	into	account?		
- Causality	level:	Was	the	operator	performance	causal,	contributory,	compounding	or	non-contributory	to	the	incident?		
- External	error	mode:	What	was	the	observable	manifestation	of	the	task	error?	
- Cognitive	domain:	Was	it	a	perception,	memory,	and	decision-making	or	action	error,	or	was	the	error	an	intended	violation?		
- Internal	error	mode:	What	specific	internal	error	occurred?	
- Psychological	error	mechanism:	Which	psychological	mechanisms	led	to	the	error?		
- Performance	shaping	factor:	Which	internal	and	external	factors	had	a	negative	influence	on	operator	performance?		
- Error	recovery:	Which	barriers	were	in	place	that	prevented	the	incident	from	developing	into	a	catastrophe/total	loss?	
- Calculation	of	inter-rater	reliability.	
• Data	analysis	
- Frequency	counts	obtained	from	the	coding	can	be	utilised	to	analyse	data.	An	overview	of	the	data	analysis	of	multiple	accident	cases	can	be	obtained	from	frequencies	and	their	distribution.		Figure	5	depicts	the	process	of	coding	incidents	using	TRACEr-Mar.	The	process	commences	with	filling	in	the	narrative	and	generic	 information	of	 the	 incident	and	continues	 in	a	cyclical	manner	until	all	of	 the	identified	task	errors	have	been	classified	according	to	the	relevant	TRACEr-Mar	taxonomies	(see	Chapter	3	for	the	detailed	TRACEr-Mar	taxonomy	tables).	
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Figure	5:	TRACEr-Mar	process	application	(adapted	from	Shorrock	and	Kirwan,	2002)	
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2.2	TRACER	AND	INTER-RATER	RELIABILITY	TRACEr-Mar,	as	adapted	to	maritime	operations	based	on	the	original	TRACEr	methodology	(Shorrock	&	Kirwan,	2002),	focuses	on	error	classification	and	coding	of	those	errors	involved	in	individual	accidents.	Although	TRACEr	has	been	used	for	human	error	(retrospective)	analysis	and	prediction,	there	is	still	a	lack	of	validation	procedures	that	are	generally	applicable	across	domains	(Walker	et	al.,	2012).	The	scope	of	 this	 guidebook	 encompasses	 the	 application	 of	 the	 taxonomy	 in	 the	 context	 of	 maritime	 accidents.	Further	research	studies	utilising	the	taxonomy	could	contribute	to	its	validation	in	the	maritime	context.		In	order	to	enhance	the	TRACEr-Mar	framework,	some	comments	about	inter-rater	reliability	should	be	given.		Inter-rater	reliability	is	a	measure	of	the	consistency	of	the	rating/coding	in	a	study.	It	is	applied	if	more	than	one	person	has	been	involved	in	the	coding	and	is	a	measure	to	determine	the	degree	to	which	the	“raters”	(i.e.,	coders)	agree	to	and	are	consistent	in	scoring/rating.	Differences	in	rating	are	the	result	of	 variability	 among	 the	 “raters”;	 no	 humans	 are	 alike	 and	 most	 ratings	 rely	 on	 a	 certain	 degree	 of	interpretation	 and	 therefore	 subjectivity.	 This	 variability	 should	 be	 considered	 carefully	 and	counterbalanced	 in	 the	 design	 phase.	 The	 measure	 of	 inter-rater	 reliability	 provides	 a	 score	 for	 the	homogeneity	of	the	rating	and	indicates	if	a	further	refinement	of	scales	might	be	required	(Heiman,	2001).		One	technique	to	determine	the	inter-rater	reliability	is	the	application	of	reliability	testing	instruments	such	as	Cohen’s	Kappa	(Walker	et	al.,	2012),	which	measures	agreement	between	categorical	variables.	It	is	recommended	to	consider	this	method	when	applying	TRACEr-Mar.	As	TRACEr-Mar	is	based	on	the	coding	being	conducted	by	“raters”,	it	is	important	to	ensure	that	the	raters	show	consistency	across	their	coding.		Several	researchers,	among	others	Stanton	et	al.	(2013),	point	out	that	 the	original	TRACEr	has	been	prone	 to	misinterpretations	and	 inconsistencies	 in	 its	application	by	analysts.			This	was	considered	during	the	adaptation	of	TRACEr	to	the	maritime	domain	and	it	is	hoped	that	issues	that	have	been	criticized	previously	have	been	dealt	with	by	the	adaptation.
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2.3	ADVANTAGES	AND	DISADVANTAGES	OF	TRACER	Advantages	and	disadvantages	of	the	TRACEr	framework	are	as	follows:	
Advantages	
• TRACEr	is	a	comprehensive	HEI	method.	
• It	can	be	used	predictively	to	identify	probable	errors	that	may	occur	in	a	specific	scenario.	
• It	can	be	used	retrospectively	to	classify	and	analyse	errors	in	incidents.	
• TRACEr	was	primarily	developed	for	ATC,	however	due	to	most	of	its	generic	taxonomies,	it	has	been	applied	in	other	domains	such	as	rail	transport	(Baysari,	Caponecchia,	McIntosh,	&	Wilson,	2009)	and	now	even	in	the	maritime	domain	(Graziano	et	al.,	2016;	Schröder-Hinrichs	et	al.	2016).	
• Even	though	it	heavily	focuses	on	errors	performed	by	the	individual	operator,	it	considers	PSFs,	which	are	system-wide.	
• Can	be	undertaken	with	a	pen	and	paper	and	related	taxonomies.	
Disadvantages	
• May	appear	overcomplicated	due	to	its	comprehensiveness.	
• Training	and	application	time	may	be	high	due	to	its	exhaustive	nature.	
• It	can	be	difficult	to	find	data	to	support	TRACEr	analyses	without	access	to	personnel	involved	in	the	incident.	
• Even	though	there	is	encouraging	usability	data	for	the	method,	there	is	a	lack	of	validation	of	the	method	in	the	academic	literature.	
• Other	error	classification	approaches	such	as	the	Systematic	Human	Error	Reduction	and	Prediction	Approach	(SHERPA)	could	be	quicker	and	simpler	to	use.	
• Exclusive	focus	on	errors	detracts	from	considering	the	wider	organisational	system	in	detail.	
• As	TRACEr	was	developed	for	ATC,	some	of	its	taxonomies	cannot	be	applied	to	other	domains.	
A	key	strength	of	TRACEr	is	that	it	can	help	a	practitioner	to	comprehensively	identify	and	classify	operator	errors	in	operator-machine	interaction.	The	fact	that	it	can	be	used	both	predictively	and	retrospectively	enhances	its	utility.	Most	of	the	TRACEr	taxonomies	are	generic	in	nature,	which	allow	the	method	to	be	seamlessly	 adapted	 to	 other	 domains.	 TRACEr	 considers	 system-wide	 PSFs	 and	 this	 adds	 depth	 to	 the	taxonomy,	 which	 primarily	 focuses	 on	 human	 error.	 TRACEr	 only	 requires	 copies	 of	 the	 pertinent	taxonomies	and	pen	and	paper	for	its	application,	making	it	easy	to	use.		On	the	flip	side,	its	comprehensiveness	may	make	the	method	seem	overly	complicated	and	it	may	require	a	long	training	and	application	time.	At	times	it	can	be	difficult	to	access	involved	personnel	and	obtain	data	to	support	TRACEr	analysis.	This	can	be	overcome	and	balanced	with	comprehensive	data	collection.		The	usability	data	 for	 the	method	 is	encouraging;	however	 there	 is	a	 lack	of	validation	of	 the	methodology,	suggesting	that	more	studies	are	required	to	validate	the	method.	A	focus	on	errors	does	detract	from	the	wider	 organisational	 system,	 however	 this	 can	 be	 balanced	 by	 addressing	 PSFs.	 Some	 of	 the	 TRACEr	taxonomies	are	specific	to	ATC	so	other	domains	will	need	to	develop	their	own	domain	specific	taxonomies	(Walker	et	al.,	2012).	This	was	one	of	the	motivations	to	develop	TRACEr-Mar	for	the	maritime	domain.			 	
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3. TRACER-MAR	TAXONOMY		The	TRACEr-Mar	 taxonomy	has	a	modular	architecture	 that	 includes	nine	coding	steps	or	classification	schemes	that	can	be	divided	into	three	main	groups	which	describe	(i)	the	context	of	the	incident,	(ii)	the	production	of	the	error	(operator	context)	and	(iii)	the	recovery	from	the	incident.	The	taxonomy	includes	the	description	of	the	error,	the	psychological	explanation	of	the	error,	measures	of	error	recovery	as	well	as	 explanations	pertaining	 to	performance	 shaping	 factors	 and	 the	 causality	 level	 of	 the	 error.	 Table	1	provides	an	overview	of	the	nine	inter-related	TRACEr	steps.	In	subsequent	sections	of	this	chapter,	each	of	these	steps	is	described	in	detail.	
Table	1:	Description	of	TRACEr-Mar	steps	
TRACER	1st	level	 TRACEr	2nd	level		 Description		
	
	
Context	of	
incident	
1.	Task	errors	 Describe	human	error	in	term	of	task	that	was	not	performed	satisfactorily	2.	Error	information	 Describe	the	subject	matter	or	the	topic	of	the	error,	i.e.,	the	human-machine	interface	3.	Causality	level	 Human	error	is	classified	as	being	causal,	contributory,	compounding	or	non-contributory	to	an	accident	
	
	
	
	
Operator	context	
4.	External	error	mode	 External	and	observable	manifestation	of	the	actual	error	5.	Cognitive	domain	 Describe	the	process	within	which	the	error	occurs	(perception,	memory,	decision,	or	action)	6.	IEM	 Describe	what	cognitive	function	failed	or	could	fail	and	in	what	way	7.	PEM	 Describe	the	psychological	nature	of	the	IEMs,	the	cognitive	biases	that	are	known	to	affect	performance	8.	PSF	 Classify	factors	that	have	influenced	or	could	influence	performance,	aggravated	the	occurrence	of	errors	or	assisted	error	recovery	
Error	recovery	 9.	Error	recovery	 Classify	how	the	driver	was	recovered	and	what	factors	influenced	the	recovery	of	the	error		Before	 analysing	 any	 data,	 some	 general	 information	 is	 required	 about	 the	 vessel	 involved	 in	 the	accident/incident	or	near-miss	to	make	sure	that	no	event	is	double-coded	(table	2).	This	information	will	also	provide	insight	about	what	factors	correlate	with	maritime	occurrences.	This	step	is	conducted	prior	to	the	identification	of	any	task	error.
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3.1	CONTEXT	OF	THE	INCIDENT	As	shown	in	Table	1,	the	Context	of	the	Incident	comprise	three	level	of	information.	In	the	first	level,	the	Task	Error,	the	context	of	the	error	is	analysed;	In	the	second	level,	the	coder	or	analyst	shall	identify	what	equipment	was	 involved	at	 the	time	of	 the	error,	 if	any;	 In	the	third	and	 last	 level,	 the	causality	 level	 is	determined.	The	three	levels	are	described	in	more	details	in	the	following	sections.		3.1.1	TASK	ERROR	The	first	step	of	TRACEr-Mar	tries	to	capture	the	context	of	the	error.	During	the	performance	of	which	task	did	the	error	occur?	To	capture	the	context	of	the	accident/incident,	a	narrative	should	be	drafted	and	a	chronological	order	of	 the	events	should	be	developed	by	the	coder.	The	text	of	 the	conclusion	of	 the	report	 can	 be	 very	 useful	 for	 the	 narrative	 and	 summarize	what	 happened.	During	 this	 step,	 it	 is	 thus	relevant	to	identify	the	location	where	(e.g.,	bridge,	deck,	engine	control	room)	the	task	was	performed	and	who	performed	it	(e.g.,	captain,	pilot,	first	officer,	bosun,	able	bodied	seaman	AB)	(table	3).	The	task	error	is	therefore	chosen	according	to	the	identified	location	and	for	each	one	a	list	of	possible	tasks	and	subtasks	is	available	for	codification.	It	is	important	to	bear	in	mind	that	the	taxonomy	architecture	was	designed	such	that	for	each	task	error	only	one	location,	one	operator	and	one	user	material	(technical	equipment)	should	be	entered	in	the	system.	For	example,	if	the	operator	makes	an	error	that	involves	two	piece	of	equipment	(e.g.,	Radar	and	AIS),	two	task	errors	must	be	created.	Once	a	task	error	has	been	identified,	the	coder	 shall	 choose	 from	 a	 list	 the	 subtask	 associated	 with	 the	 particular	 task	 error.	 This	 increased	granularity	is	particularly	relevant	when	it	associates	the	task	error	with	the	technical	equipment	involved	and	for	in-depth	statistical	analyses.	Part	of	the	taxonomy	has	been	adapted	following	the	suggestions	made	by	Graziano,	Teixeira,	and	Guedes	Soares	(2016).			
Table	2:	Generic	vessel	information	
IMO	vessel	
number/call	sign	
Note	the	IMO	vessel	number,	when	indicated.	Otherwise	please	note	the	call	sign	of	the	vessel	for	identification	
Name	of	vessel	 Name	of	the	vessel	at	the	time	of	the	occurrence	as	indicated	in	the	report	
Date	of	occurrence	 The	date	of	the	occurrence	as	indicated	in	the	report	
Geographical	position	 Insert	the	GPS	location	of	the	vessel	when	the	incident	occurred	
Severity	of	
occurrence	
		Near-miss,	on-board	injury/fatality,	mitigated	loss,	severe	loss,	total	loss	
Type	of	occurrence	 Fire,	explosion,	grounding,	foundering,	stranding,	capsized,	listed,	flooded,	collision,	hull,	machinery,	other	
Flag	state	 The	flag	state	of	the	vessel	at	the	time	of	the	occurrence	(when	indicated	in	the	report)	
Type	of	vessel	 Tanker,	combined	carrier,	product	carrier,	gas	carrier,	chemical	carrier,	bulk	carrier,	Ro-Ro,	tween	decker,	container	carrier,	reefer,	cruise	ship,	ferry	
Deadweight	or	GRT	 The	deadweight	or	GRT	of	the	vessel	as	indicated	in	the	report	
Age	of	vessel	 The	age	of	the	vessel	at	the	time	of	occurrence,	in	years,	should	be	noted	
Station	on	the	vessel	 The	location	on	the	vessel	where	the	incident	was	triggered	should	be	identified	
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Table	3:	Operator	
Operator	performing	the	task	error	
Bridge	 Indicate	the	operator	(master,	chief	officer,	second	officer,	helmsman,	deck	cadet	officer,	etc.)	
Deck	 Indicate	the	operator	(bosun,	AB,	oiler,	etc.)	
Engine	(Control)	Room	 Indicate	the	operator	(chief	engineer,	second	engineer,	third	engineer,	etc.)	
Other	 Please	indicate	in	writing	
Tables	 4,	 5	 and	 6	 outline	 the	 task	 errors	 created	 for	 each	 location	 on	 board:	 bridge,	 deck	 and	 engine	(control)	room.	After	having	identified	the	operator	and	the	location,	the	coder	must	identify	the	nature	of	the	task	the	operator	was	performing	at	the	time	the	error	occurred.		
Table	4:	Task	errors	attributed	to	location	bridge	
Bridge	
Internal	
communication	
Communication	between	crew	members	both	on	the	bridge	or	between	the	bridge	and	the	engine	control	room	or	the	bridge	and	the	deck	
External	
communication	
Communication	between	a	crew	member	and	a	third	party	on	another	vessel	or	ashore	
Hand-over/take-
over	
Some	relevant	information	was	not	passed	on	during	the	hand-over	process.	This	information	was	crucial	and	led	to	or	contributed	to	the	accident	
Safety	drills	 The	safety	drills	were	not	performed	according	to	the	regulations.	This	led	to	a	situation	where	an	emergency	could	not	be	brought	under	control	
Supervision	 Supervision	was	not	performed	with	care.	A	mistake	was	not	noticed	and	led	to	the	incident.	This	also	involves	the	control	exercised	over	another	crew	member	tasked	to	do	a	specific	job	
Navigation	 A	navigational	error	occurred	and	led	to	an	emergency	situation	(e.g.,	manoeuvring	errors,	course	change)	
Traffic	monitoring	
and	Watchkeeping	
The	traffic	was	not	monitored	with	enough	attention;	critical	information	was	not	perceived	and	this	led	to	an	incident.	Watchkeeping	was	not	conducted	with	care.	Errors	belonging	in	this	category	deal	with	the	general	control	of	the	surroundings	of	the	vessel	and/or	position	of	the	vessel.	This	category	should	not	be	confused	with	navigation		
Voyage	planning	
including	
preparation	
An	error	occurred	during	voyage	planning.	The	error	was	not	discovered	and	led	to	a	risky	situation.	It	is	important	to	specify	the	equipment,	if	any,	used	when	the	error	was	performed	
Other	tasks	 Any	other	task	related	to	the	bridge	personnel	that	was	not	performed	properly	and	had	serious	consequences.	Free	text	category	
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Table	5:	Task	errors	attributed	to	location	deck	
Deck	
Internal	
communication	
Communication	between	crew	members	
External	
communication	
Communication	between	a	crew	member	and	a	third	party	on	another	vessel	or	ashore	
Hand-over/take-
over	
Some	relevant	information	was	not	passed	on	during	the	hand-over	process.	This	information	was	crucial	and	led	to	or	contributed	to	the	accident	
Safety	drills	 The	safety	drills	were	not	performed	according	to	the	regulations.	This	led	to	a	situation	where	an	emergency	could	not	be	controlled	
Supervision	 Supervision	was	not	performed	with	care.	A	mistake	was	not	noticed	and	led	to	an	incident.	It	also	involves	the	oversight	of	another	crew	member	tasked	to	do	a	specific	job	
Mooring	operations	 During	mooring	operations	a	mistake	was	made	that	had	negative	consequences	
Cargo-work	 During	cargo-handling	work	a	mistake	led	to	an	emergency	situation	
Maintenance	work	 During	maintenance	work	an	error	led	to	a	risky	situation	
Other	tasks	 Any	other	task	that	was	performed	by	the	deck	personnel	and	which	was	performed	faultily	and	led	to	an	incident	
Table	6:	Task	errors	attributed	to	location	engine	(control)	room	
Engine	(Control)	Room	
Internal	
communication	
Communication	between	crew	members	
Hand-over/take-
over	
Some	relevant	information	was	not	passed	on	during	the	hand-over	process.	This	information	was	crucial	and	led	to	or	contributed	to	the	accident	
Safety	drills	 The	safety	drills	were	not	performed	according	to	the	regulations.	This	led	to	a	situation	where	an	emergency	could	not	be	controlled	
Supervision	 Supervision	was	not	performed	with	care.	A	mistake	was	not	noticed	and	led	to	the	incident.	It	also	involves	the	oversight	of	another	crew	member	tasked	to	do	a	specific	job	
Monitoring	of	
engine	room	
control	panel	
The	monitoring	of	the	engine	room	control	panel	was	not	performed	with	enough	care	and	this	action	led	to	an	emergency.	It	also	involves	the	engine	room	panel	in	the	cabin	of	the	engineer	on	watch	during	night	hours	
Maintenance	of	
equipment	
During	maintenance	work	an	error	led	to	a	risky	situation	
Other	tasks	 Any	other	task	that	was	performed	by	the	engine	room	personnel	and	which	was	performed	faultily	and	led	to	an	incident		3.1.2	ERROR	INFORMATION	The	category	‘error	information’	helps	the	researcher	to	look	more	closely	at	the	context	of	an	accident.	It	deals	with	the	equipment	involved	in	the	error,	denoted	as	‘user	material’	in	the	taxonomy	(e.g.,	radar,	GPS,		ECDIS,	AIS,	alarm	panels),	and	which	information	concerning	the	vessel,	if	any,	was	not	taken	into	account	and	 represents	 a	 contributory	 factor	 to	 the	 accident	 (e.g.,	 size	 and	 dimension,	 stability	 of	 the	 vessel,	condition	of	navigational	aids).	The	coder	should	be	aware	that	the	technical	equipment	is	directly	related	to	the	location	and	that	for	each	task	error	identified	in	tables	4,	5	and	6,	a	subtask	must	be	chosen;	this	additional	step	gives	more	granularity	to	understanding	the	error.		
	TRACEr-Mar	–	Technique	for	the	Retrospective	and	predictive	Analysis	of	Cognitive	Errors	adapted	to	the	Maritime	domain	
15	 WMU	Papers	in	Maritime	and	Ocean	Affairs	No.1	 	 																																								
3.1 .2 .1 	USER 	MATERIAL 	(TECHNICAL 	EQUIPMENT) 	The	 user	 material	 relates	 to	 the	 technical	 and	 non-technical	 equipment	 that	 is	 used	 on	 a	 vessel.	 It	 is	separated	into	the	three	locations	for	more	detailed	analysis	(tables	7,	8	and	9).		Once	the	bridge,	deck	or	engine	 (control)	 room	 has	 been	 chosen	 as	 the	 location	 where	 the	 task	 error	 happened,	 the	 available	technical	 equipment	 that	was	not	working	properly	 or	 from	which	 some	 information	was	deducted	 or	misinterpreted	can	be	identified.	
Table	7:	User	material	for	location	bridge	
Bridge	
Radar	 Information	 from	 the	 radar	was	 read	 out	 or	 interpreted	wrongly	 or	 not	taken	into	account	
GPS	 Information	from	the	GPS	was	read	out	or	interpreted	wrongly	or	not	taken	into	account	
BNWAS	 The	BNWAS	was	switched	off	or	the	alarm	was	not	audible	
ECDIS	 Information	 from	 the	ECDIS	was	 read	out	or	 interpreted	wrongly	or	not	taken	into	account	
ECS	 Information	from	the	ECS	was	read	out	or	interpreted	wrongly	or	not	taken	into	account	
	 	
AIS	 Information	from	the	AIS	was	read	out	or	interpreted	wrongly	or	not	taken	into	account	
Echo	sounder	 Information	from	the	echo	sounder	was	read	out	or	interpreted	wrongly	or	not	taken	into	account	
Autopilot	 Faulty	interaction	with	the	autopilot	led	to	the	incident	
Steering	panel	 Faulty	interaction	with	the	steering	panel	led	to	the	incident	
External	equipment	 Faulty	interaction	with	the	external	equipment	led	to	the	incident	
Sea	chart	 Information	from	the	sea	chart	was	read	out	or	interpreted	wrongly	or	not	taken	into	account	
VHF	 Problems	with	the	VHF	led	to	the	occurrence	of	an	error	
Other	communication	devices	 Problems	with	the	other	communication	devices	led	to	the	occurrence	of	an	error	
Alarm	panels	 Information	from	alarm	panels	was	read	out	or	interpreted	wrongly	or	not	taken	into	account	
Engine	room	controls	 Information	 from	 engine	 room	 controls	 was	 read	 out	 or	 interpreted	wrongly	or	not	taken	into	account	
Checklists	&	forms	 Checklists	or	forms	were	not	filled	out	as	required	leading	to	an	incident	
Handbooks	 Information	from	handbooks	was	read	out	or	interpreted	wrongly	or	not	taken	into	account	
Decision	 support	 system	 (paper,	
electronic)	
Faulty	interaction	with	the	decision	support	system	led	to	the	incident	
Stairs	&	ladders	 An	error	occurred	while	the	operator	was	using	the	stairs	or	a	ladder	
Other	material	 Other	material	was	used	when	the	error	occurred	
No	technical	equipment	involved	 The	task	error	did	not	involve	a	human-machine/tool-interface		 	
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Table	8:	User	material	for	location	deck	
Deck	
Communication	devices	 Problems	with	communication	devices	led	to	the	occurrence	of	an	error	
Monitoring	devices	 Problems	with	monitoring	devices	led	to	the	occurrence	of	an	error	
Loading	devices	(cranes,	pumps)	 Problems	with	loading	devices	led	to	the	occurrence	of	an	error	
Mooring	equipment	 Problems	with	mooring	equipment	led	to	the	occurrence	of	an	error	
Forms,	checklists	 Checklists	or	forms	were	not	filled	out	as	required	leading	to	an	incident	
Other	working	tools	 Other	working	tools	were	in	use	when	the	error	occurred	
Stairs	&	ladders	 An	error	occurred	while	the	operator	was	using	the	stairs	or	a	ladder	
Emergency	response	equipment	 Problems	with	emergency	response	equipment	led	to	the	occurrence	of	an	error	
Other	material	 Other	material	was	used	when	the	error	occurred	
No	technical	equipment	involved	 The	task	error	did	not	involve	a	human-machine/tool-interface		
Table	9:	User	material	for	location	engine	(control)	room	
Engine	(Control)	Room	
Main	engine	 Problems	with	the	main	engine	led	to	the	occurrence	of	an	error	
Auxiliary	engine	 Problems	with	an	auxiliary	engine	led	to	the	occurrence	of	an	error	
Engine	control	room	panel	 Information	from	the	engine	control	room	panel	was	read	out	or	interpreted	wrongly	or	not	taken	into	account	
Fuel	pumps	 Problems	with	fuel	pumps	led	to	the	occurrence	of	an	error	
Boilers	 Problems	with	boilers	led	to	the	occurrence	of	an	error	
Turbo	chargers	 Problems	with	turbo	chargers	led	to	the	occurrence	of	an	error	
Separators	 Problems	with	separators	led	to	the	occurrence	of	an	error	
Ballast	water	pumps		 Problems	with	ballast	water	pumps	led	to	the	occurrence	of	an	error	
Communication	equipment	 Problems	with	communication	equipment	led	to	the	occurrence	of	an	error	
Forms,	checklists	 Checklists	or	forms	were	not	filled	out	as	required	leading	to	an	incident	
Handbooks	 Information	 from	handbooks	was	read	out	or	 interpreted	wrongly	or	not	taken	into	account	
Generators	 Problems	with	generators	led	to	the	occurrence	of	an	error	
Electricity	control	panel	 Problems	with	an	electricity	control	panel	led	to	the	occurrence	of	an	error	
Stairs	&	ladders	 An	error	occurred	while	the	operator	was	using	the	stairs	or	a	ladder	
Steering	system	 Problems	with	the	steering	system	led	to	the	occurrence	of	an	error	
Other	material	 Other	material	was	used	when	the	error	occurred	
No	technical	equipment	involved	 The	task	error	did	not	involve	a	human-machine/tool-interface	
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3.1 .2 .2 	USER 	ACTIVITIES 	For	every	task	error	identified	above	(tables	4,	5	and	6)	a	subtask	or	user	activity	is	added	in	order	give	a	better	understanding	of	the	activity	performed	by	the	operator.	For	each	task	error,	it	is	possible	to	choose	between	several	subtasks,	which	are	set	out	in	tables	10,	11	and	12	for	bridge,	deck	and	engine	(control)	room	respectively.	
Table	10:	User	activities	for	location	Bridge	
Bridge	
Internal	communication	 Communication	between	bridge	officers,	between	officers	and	the	captain,		between	bridge	and	deck,	between	bridge	and	engine	room,	between	bridge	officers	and	helmsman	
External	communication	 Communication	 between	 bridge	 and	 pilot,	 bridge	 and	 port	 employees,	bridge	and	tug	boat	
Hand-over/take-over	 Hand-over	between	captain	and	officers,	between	officers	
Safety	drills	 Safety	drills	not	performed	with	care	
Supervision	 Supervision	of	deck	work,	bridge	tasks,	engine	room	work	
Navigation	 Dead	 reckoning,	 radar	 navigation,	 satellite	 navigation,	 pilotage,	manoeuvring,	emergency	manoeuvring	
Traffic	monitoring	&	
watchkeeping	
	Watchkeeping	 (maintaining	 a	 proper	 lookout),	 monitoring	 equipment	regarding	traffic,	anchorage,	monitoring	of	sea	chart	
	 	
Table	10	(cont.):	User	activities	for	location	Bridge		
Voyage	planning	including	
preparation	
Appraisal,	planning,		monitoring	
Other	tasks	 Other	 tasks	were	 performed	 unsatisfactorily	 leading	 to	 the	 error.	 Please	indicate	in	writing	
Table	11:	User	activities	for	location	deck	
Deck	
Internal	communication	 Communication	 between,	 e.g.,	 ABs/OSs,	 between	 bosun	 and	 AB/OS,	between	bridge	and	deck,	between	deck	and	engine	room	
External	communication	 Communication	between	deck	personnel	and	pilot,	port	employees,	tug	boat	
Hand-over/take-over	 Hand-over	of	tasks	between	AB/OS,	between	bosun	and	AB/OS	
Safety	drills	 Safety	drills	not	performed	with	care	
Supervision	 Supervision	of	deck	work	
Mooring	operations	 Mooring	in	harbour,	anchoring	
Cargo	work	 In	harbour,	en	route,	loading,	unloading	
Maintenance	work	 Painting,	rust	removal,	maintenance	of	machinery,	maintenance	deck	
Other	tasks	 Other	 tasks	 were	 performed	 unsatisfactorily	leading	to	the	error.	Please	indicate	in	writing	
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Table	12:	User	activities	for	location	engine	(control)	room	
Engine	(Control)	Room	
Internal	communication	 Communication	between	engineers,	between	AB/OS,	between	AB/OS	and	engineers,	between	engine	room	and	deck,	between	bridge	and	engine	room	
Hand-over/take-over	 Hand-over	 tasks	 between	 engineers,	 between	AB/OS,	 between	 engineers	and	ABs/OSs	
Safety	drills	 Safety	drills	not	performed	with	care	
Supervision	 Supervision	of	engine	room	work	
Monitoring	of	engine	room	
control	panel	
The	engine	room	control	panel	was	not	monitored	at	all	or	not	monitored	with	care	so	that	information	was	not	registered,	information	was	wrongly	interpreted	
Maintenance	work	 Painting,	rust	removal,	maintenance	of	machinery	
Other	tasks	 Other	 tasks	were	 performed	 unsatisfactorily	 leading	 to	 the	 error.	 Please	indicate	in	writing		
3.1 .2 .3 	SHIP 	F IXED 	 INFORMATION	Coding	must	also	capture	ship	fixed	information	mentioned	in	the	accident	report	that	was	not	taken	into	account	or	underestimated	as	it	could	be	a	contributory	factor	to	the	incident	(table	13).	
Table	13:	Ship	fixed	information	
Ship	fixed	information	
Size	and	dimensions	 Fixed	 information	about	 the	build	of	 the	ship	was	not	 taken	 into	account	leading	to	an	incident	
Manoeuvring	characteristics	 Fixed	information	concerning	the	reaction	of	the	ship	to	manoeuvres	and	its	movement	characteristics	in	water	was	not	taken	into	account	leading	to	an	incident	
Maine	engine	specifics,	
propulsion	
Fixed	information	concerning	the	performance	of	a	vessel’s	machinery	was	not	taken	into	account	leading	to	an	incident	
Stability	of	the	vessel	 Information	on	how	stable	a	ship	is	in	a	certain	situation	and	how	she	reacts	was	not	taken	into	account	leading	to	an	incident	
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3.1 .2 .4 	SHIP 	VARIABLE 	 INFORMATION	As	for	ship	fixed	information,	information	varies	between	vessels	that	must	also	be	considered	during	coding	as	it	could	be	a	contributory	factor	to	the	incident	(table	14).		
Table	14:	Ship	variable	information	
Ship	variable	information	
Draught,	trim,	list,	current	
stability	
Specific	information	for	the	ship	concerning	the	draught,	list,	trim	or	current	stability	issues	were	not	taken	into	account	and	lead	to	an	incident	
Current	propulsion,	machinery	
deficiencies	
Specific	information	concerning	the	propulsion,	machinery	deficiencies	or	other	similar	issues	were	not	taken	into	account	and	lead	to	an	incident	
Condition	of	navigational	aids	 Specific	 information	 concerning	 the	 condition	 of	 navigational	 aids,	 i.e.,	problems	 or	 deficiencies,	 were	 not	 taken	 into	 account	 and	 lead	 to	 an	incident.	Error	margins	or	variations	in	the	display	of	information	were	not	taken	into	account	3.1.3	CAUSALITY 	LEVEL	To	complete	the	analysis,	it	is	essential	to	classify	the	errors	by	their	causality	level,	i.e.,	their	significance	in	contributing	to	the	error.	Table	15	sets	out	four	levels	of	causality.	
Table	15:	Error	causality	level	
Type	 Description	
Causal	 The	operator’s	action	was	the	ultimate	cause	without	which	the	incident	would	not	have	happened	
Contributory	 An	error	that	contributed	to	the	incident	and	occurred	in	addition	to	the	causal	error	but	the	error	would	probably	still	have	occurred	
Compounding	 An	error	that	made	the	situation	worse	and	that	occurred	after	the	person	realised	that	the	situation	was	going	to	occur	
Non-contributory	 Other	errors	that	occurred	but	had	no	bearing	on	the	situation	
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3.2	CONTEXT	OF	THE	OPERATOR	The	main	strength	of	the	TRACEr-Mar	taxonomy	is	represented	by	the	operator’s	cognitive	process	and	the	context	in	which	the	operator	is	operating	while	performing	an	erroneous	task.		The	focus	on	the	cognitive	context	is	in	line	with	the	need	to	analyse	the	performance	variability	of	an	operator	where	performance	variability	is	defined	as	“the	way	in	which	individual	and	collective	performances	are	adjusted	to	match	current	 demands	 and	 resources,	 in	 order	 to	 ensure	 that	 things	 go	 right”	 (EUROCONTROL,	 2009).	Understanding	how	crew	members	adjust	or	not	their	performance	during	both	expected	and	unexpected	conditions	may	 help	 further	 studies	 on	 how	 to	 enhance	 system	 response.	 In	 this	 regard,	 TRACEr-Mar	considers	 additional	 five	 steps:	 the	 external	 error	mode	 (EEM);	 cognitive	 domain;	 internal	 error	mode	(IEM);	psychological	error	mechanism	(PEM);	and	performance	shaping	 factor	 (PSF).	 	The	 focus	at	 this	point	of	the	coding	is	to	emphasise	the	error	production	and	to	analyse	in	detail	which	external	and	internal	factors	may	have	had	an	influence	on	the	crew	member.		3.2.1	EXTERNAL	ERROR	MODE	One	of	the	first	challenges	is	the	coding	of	the	different	error	modes	(EEM).	The	EEM,	according	to	Shorrock	and	Kirwan	(2002),	is	the	external	and	observable	manifestation	of	an	error	based	on	the	logical	outcome	of	an	erroneous	action	in	term	of	timing	sequence,	selection,	quality,	etc.	EEMs	are	generally	context	free	and	independent	from	any	cognitive	process.		EEMs	are	classified	in	three	main	areas:	selection	and	quality,	timing	and	sequence,	and	communication	(table	16).	This	category	is	often	used	only	for	error	prediction	due	to	its	limited	descriptive	nature.	A	full	overview	is	given	below.	
Table	16:	Overview	of	external		error	mode	
Selection	and	quality	 Timing	and	Sequence	 Communication	Omission	Action	too	much	Action	too	little	Action	in	wrong	direction	Wrong	action	on	right	object	Right	action	on	wrong	object	Wrong	action	on	wrong	object	Extraneous	act	
Action	too	long	Action	too	short	Action	too	early	Action	too	late	Action	repeated	Mis-ordering	
Unclear	information	transmitted	Unclear	information	recorded	Information	not	sought/obtained	Information	not	transmitted	Information	not	recorded	Incomplete	information	transmitted	Incomplete	information	recorded	Incorrect	information	transmitted	Incorrect	information	recorded		3.2.2	COGNITIVE 	DOMAIN	The	 cognitive	 domain	 represent	 the	 taxonomy	 level	 that	 potentially	 applies	 to	 the	 error	 under	consideration,	i.e.,	perception,	memory,	decision-making	and	action.	These	four	categories	deal	with	errors	that	are	non-intentional.		The	final	category,	violation,	indicates	a	voluntary	breach	of	the	rules.			
- Perception	deals	with	the	input	of	information	and	the	question	of	whether	or	not	the	user	received	the	necessary	information	in	order	to	be	able	to	process	it.		
- Memory	means	 that	 the	user	did	perceive	 the	 information,	but	did	not	deal	with	 the	perceived	critical	 situation	 or	 the	 crucial	 information	 in	 the	 way	 the	 he	 or	 she	 should	 have	 due	 to	 not	remembering	correctly	or	to	not	knowing	what	to	do.		
- Decision-making	means	that	the	user	received	the	crucial	information	and	processed	it	correctly,	but	came	to	a	wrong	conclusion	and	therefore	took	a	wrong	decision.		
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- Action	means	 that	 the	user	perceived	 and	processed	 the	 information	 correctly,	made	 a	 correct	decision,	but	then	made	a	mistake	in	the	implementation	of	the	action.	
- Violation	means	an	intended	violation	of	rules	and	regulations	that	finally	led	to	the	incident.	This	category	is	added	based	on	Reasons	(1990)	model	summarizing	the	principal	error	types.	The	categories	IEM	and	PEM	are	strictly	related	to	the	cognitive	domain	chosen	(table	17).	Both	represent	a	better	explanation	of	the	cognitive	domain	by	providing	a	description	of	what	cognitive	function	failed,	or	could	fail,	and	in	what	way	(Shorrock	&	Kirwan	2002).	IEMs	describe	the	internal	taxonomy	of	the	seafarer’s	error	within	each	cognitive	domain,	i.e.,	what	error	did	the	user	commit.	PEMs	describe	the	psychological	reason(s)	that	can	be	attributed	to	the	occurrence	of	the	error.	Tables	18,	19,	20	and	21	describe	these	taxonomies	in	detail.	
Table	17:	List	of	IEMs	and	PEMs	
Internal	Error	Mode	 Psychology	Error	Mechanism	
Perception	Mishear	Mis-see	No	detection	(audio	or	visual)	Late	auditory	recognition	Late	detection	(visual)	Repeat	error	Misread	Visual	misperception	
Expectation	Confusion	Discrimination	failure	Tunnel	vision	Overloaded	Vigilance	Distraction/	preoccupation	
Memory	Forget	to	monitor	Omitted	or	late	action	Forget	temporary	information	Forget	store	information	Mis-recall	information	or	action	Prospective	memory	failure	Forget	to	ask/share	information	
Memory	confusion	Memory	overloaded	Insufficient	familiarisation	/learning	Mental	block	Distraction/	preoccupation	Similarity	interference	
Decision-making	Mis-projection	Poor	decision	and	poor	planning	Late	decision	or	late	planning	No	decision	or	no	planning	
Misinterpretation	Failure	to	consider	side	or	long	term	effects	Mind	set	Knowledge	/	competency	problem	Decision	freeze	or	overloaded	Risk	recognition	failure	
Action	Information	or	data	entry	error		Selection	error	Unclear	information	Incorrect	information	Non	–	performed	action	Timing	error	Unclear	information	recorded	Information	not	transmit	
Manual	variability	Confusion	Habit	intrusion	Distraction/	preoccupation	Other	slip	
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3.2 .2 .1 	 INTERNAL 	ERROR	MODE	After	 selecting	 the	 cognitive	 domain,	 the	 first	 step	 is	 to	 choose	 the	 most	 likely	 IEM	 for	 the	 identified	cognitive	domain.	The	single	most	appropriate	 IEM	should	be	selected	from	the	 identified	domains	and	recorded.	Tables	18	and	19	set	out	details	for	each	IEM	by	cognitive	domain.	
Table	18:	IEM:	Perception	and	memory	
Perception	
Mishear	 The	signal(s)	of	technical	equipment	were	not	heard	accurately	
Mis-see	 The	signal	of	technical	equipment	was	not	seen	properly.	This	aspect	focusses	on	the	ergonomic	or	physical	part	of	human	perception	
No	detection	(audio/visual)	 The	signal	of	technical	equipment	was	not	seen	or	heard	
Late	detection	 The	signal	of	technical	equipment	was	only	detected	when	it	was	too	late	to	correct	the	situation	
Repeated	error	 Repeating	a	mistake	leading	to	a	worsening	of	the	situation	
Misread	 The	information	from	the	technical	equipment	was	misread	
Visual	misperception	 The	visual	signal	was	inaccurately	perceived/	misperceived	by	the	operator	
Memory	
Forget	to	monitor	 The	operator	forgot	to	monitor	the	technical	equipment	
Omitted	or	late	action	 The	error	leading	to	the	accident	can	be	traced	back	to	an	operator	who	omitted	to	act	or	reacted	late	to	a	warning	signal	
Forget	temporary	information	 The	error	can	be	traced	back	to	a	user	who	temporarily	forgot	relevant	information	
Forget	to	store	information	 The	error	can	be	traced	back	to	a	failure	in	storing	relevant	information	
Mis-recall	information/action	 The	user	recalls	inaccurate	information	and	provides	an	inaccurate	account	of	his	or	her	actions	post	incident	
Prospective	memory	failure	 Post-incident	failure	in	recalling	the	event	as	it	happened	
Forget	to	ask	/	share	information	 The	operator	suffered	from	a	lack	of	information	as	he	or	she	forgot	to	ask	for	relevant	information/	share	relevant	information	with	other	crew	members	
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Table	19:	IEM:	Decision-making	and	action	
Decision-making	
Mis-projection	 Faulty	interpretation	of	information	
Poor	decision/planning	 A	wrong	decision	taken	that	led	to	or	could	not	prevent	the	incident	
Late	decision/planning	 The	decision	was	taken	too	late	to	prevent	the	incident	
No	decision/planning	 No	decision	was	taken	to	prevent	the	incident	
Action	
Information/data	entry	error	 The	wrong	information	was	entered	into	technical	equipment	
Table	19	(cont.):	IEM:	Decision-making	and	action		
Selection	error	 The	wrong	technical	equipment	was	selected	for	performing	a	certain	task	
Unclear	information	 The	information	transferred	to	another	party	via	technical	equipment	was	not	clear	
Incorrect	information	 The	information	transferred	to	another	involved	party	via	technical	equipment	was	not	correct	
Non-performed	action	 No	action	was	taken	in	order	to	prevent	the	incident	
Timing	error	 The	action	taken	was	not	faulty	itself,	but	occurred	at	the	wrong	moment	
Unclear	information	recorded	 The	information	that	was	recorded	was	not	clear	
Information	not	transmitted	 Necessary	information	was	not	transmitted	/	transferred	to	the	involved	parties	
Violation	
Routine	violation	 On	the	vessel	informal	work	practises	were	followed	instead	of	complying	with	formal	rules.	The	formal	rule	was	routinely	disobeyed	
Exceptional	violation	 The	formal	rule	was	not	followed	only	in	this	one	scenario,	which	led	to	the	incident	
Sabotage	 The	official	rule	was	not	followed	with	the	intention	to	cause	harm			 	
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3.2 .2 .2 	PSYCHOLOGICAL 	ERROR 	MECHANISM	After	the	IEM	is	identified,	the	next	step	is	choosing	the	most	likely	PEM.	The	PEM	needs	to	correspond	to	the	 same	domain	as	 the	 IEM	(tables	20	and	21).	 	 For	 instance,	 if	 the	 IEM	 is	 selected	 from	 the	memory	domain,	then	the	PEM	is	also	selected	from	the	memory	domain.	More	than	one	PEM	can	be	selected	for	each	error.	PEMs	are	fundamental	to	describing	the	psychological	reason(s)	that	determine	why	the	error	occurred.	
Table	20:	PEM:	Perception	and	memory	
Perception	
Expectation	 Information	was	not	perceived	properly	as	the	operator	was	influenced	by	an	expectation	bias,	i.e.,	the	operator	only	perceived	the	information	that	was	expected	and	supported	his	or	her	view	of	the	situation	
Confusion	 The	operator	confused	information	with	something	else	
Discrimination	failure	 The	operator	received	the	information,	but	did	not	process	it	as	it	was		perceived	to	be	irrelevant		
Tunnel	vision	 The	operator	focused	on	one	single	technical	equipment	or	piece	of	information,	ignoring	all	the	others	and	not	perceiving	the	relevant	information	
Overloaded	 The	operator	was	overloaded	with	other	information	and	therefore	did	not	perceive	the	new	information	
Vigilance	 The	operator	did	not	perceive	the	necessary	information	due	to	lack	of	vigilance	
Distraction	 The	operator	was	distracted	and	therefore	did	not	perceive	the	information	
Memory	
Memory	confusion	 The	operator	got	confused	and	used	the	wrong	information	for	the	given	situation		
Table	20	(cont.):	PEM:	Perception	and	memory		
Memory	overload	 The	operator’s	memory	was	overloaded	as	he	or	she	was	simultaneously	processing	other	information	
Insufficient	familiarisation	 The	operator	was	not	familiar	with	the	kind	of	information	that	should	be	processed	and	therefore	erred	in	processing	it	
Mental	block	 Operator	could	not	access	the	relevant	information	
Distraction	 The	operator	was	processing	other	information	and	therefore	did	not	realize	the	relevance	of	the	new	information	and	failed	to	process	it	
Similarity	interference	 Due	to	the	similarity	of	the	character	of	the	information	the	operator	processed	the	information	based	on	wrong	assumptions	
		 	
	TRACEr-Mar	–	Technique	for	the	Retrospective	and	predictive	Analysis	of	Cognitive	Errors	adapted	to	the	Maritime	domain	
25	 WMU	Papers	in	Maritime	and	Ocean	Affairs	No.1	 	 																																								
Table	21:	PEM:	Decision-making	and	action	
Decision-making	
Misinterpretation	 The	data	were	misinterpreted	leading	to	a	wrong	decision	
Failure	to	consider	side	or	long-
term	effects	
The	operator	did	not	consider	the	long-term	or	side	effects	of	the	situation	
Mind	set	 The	mind	set	and	world	view	of	the	operator	had	an	important	influence	on	decision-making	and	eventually	led	to	a	wrong	decision	
Knowledge/competency	problems	 The	operator	did	not	have	the	necessary	competency	or	knowledge	to	make	the	right	decision	
Decision	freeze	or	overload	 The	operator	was	overloaded	with	information	or	tasks	and	was	therefore	unable	to	make	a	decision	
Risk	cognition	failure	 The	operator	failed	to	recognize	the	risk	in	a	given	situation	or	the	decision	taken	
Action	
Manual	variability	 The	risky	situation	occurred	due	to	a	mistake	in	the	manual	handling	of	technical	equipment	
Confusion	 The	operator	got	confused	and	used	the	wrong	technical	equipment	for	the	action	he	or	she	wanted	to	perform	
Habit	intrusion	 Out	of	habit	the	operator	handled	the	technical	equipment	in	a	certain	way.	However,	this	action	led	to	a	mistake	in	the	given	situation	
Distraction/preoccupation	 The	operator	was	distracted	or	preoccupied	with	something	else	and	therefore	did	not	perform	the	necessary	action	
Other	slip	 Any	other	slip	that	occurred	in	connection	with	the	handling	of	technical	equipment	
(Intended)	Violation	
Stress/pressure	 Stress	and	pressure	to	perform	lead	to	risky	actions	that	consciously	violated	existing	rules	
Fatigue	 Body	and	cognitive	fatigue	leading	to	risk	taking	behaviour/risky	decisions	being	taken	consciously	
Intoxication	 The	operator	is	intoxicated	due	to	alcohol,	drugs	or	medicine	and	consciously	makes	a	risky	decision	
Lack	of	knowledge	 The	operator	takes	a	risk	knowing	the	rules	that	are	being	violated,	but	not	being	aware	of/not	knowing	the	potential	consequences	
Emotional	condition	 The	operator	is	dissatisfied	or	emotionally	unstable	leading	him	or	her	to	willingly	not	follow	the	procedures	and	rules	in	place		 				 	
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3.2.3	PERFORMANCE	SHAPING	FACTORS	The	final	category	of	the	operator	context	level	is	the	PSF.	PSFs	help	to	classify	all	factors	that	could	have	influenced	the	performance	of	the	crew	member:	personal	factors,	aspects	of	communication/information,	internal/external	environment,	organisational	factors	and	other.	Tables	22	set	out	the	details	of	the	PSFs.	
Table	22:	Performance	Shaping	Factors	I	
Personal	factors	
Cognitive	fatigue	 Cognitive	fatigue	influenced	a	person’s	performance	in	an	emergency	situation	
Body	fatigue		 Body	fatigue	influenced	a	person’s	performance	in	an	emergency	situation	
Stress	 A	person	being	qualitatively	or	quantitatively	overloaded	or	under	challenged	which	influenced	his	or	her	performance	
Intoxication	 A	person	was	intoxicated	either	by	alcohol,	drugs,	medicine	or	by	engine	fumes.	This	led	to	a	limitation	in	their	performance	
Emotional	condition	 The	person	was	preoccupied	with	some	personal	matters	and	did	not	perform	at	their	usual	level	
Aspects	of	communication/information	
Ambiguous	
information	
The	information	received	from	technical	equipment	or	other	persons	was	ambiguous	and	the	person	did	not	know	which	information	to	rely	on	
Lack	of	information	 The	person	did	not	have	the	crucial	information	at	hand	to	come	to	a	good	conclusion	in	a	certain	situation	
Wrong	information	 The	received	information	for	decision-making	was	wrong	
Language	problems	 Misunderstandings	occurred	due	to	language	barriers	
Miscommunication	 Miscommunication	occurred	for	various	reasons	
Training/competence	
Lack	of	experience	 The	person	lacked	experience	and	could	not	perform	to	expected	standards	
Lack	of	orientation	 The	person	did	not	have	the	necessary	orientation	in	a	certain	situation	and	this	decreased	his	or	her	performance	level	
Inadequate	
training/instruction	
The	person	had	inadequate	instruction	and	training	on	how	to	react/what	to	do	in	a	certain	situation	and	therefore	could	not	perform	to	the	expected	standards	
No	training	 The	person	had	no	training	and	could	not	perform	to	the	expected	standards	
Internal/external	environment	
Weather	 Weather/climate	and	related	issues	had	an	influence	on	the	operator	or	the	technical	equipment	and	influenced	his/her/its	performance	
Time	of	day	 Sunshine	or	darkness	influenced	the	operator’s	performance	
Atmosphere	on	the	
vessel	
The	onboard	workplace	environment	influenced	the	individual	behaviour	of	the	operator	leading	to	worse	performance	
Business	climate	 The	business	operations	of	the	shipping	company	influenced	the	performance	on	board	the	vessel,	e.g.,	budget	restrictions	
Organisational	factors	
Organisational	
culture	
The	overall	organisational	culture	of	the	shipping	company	had	an	influence	on	the	performance	on	the	ship	(e.g.	safety	culture)	
Organisational	
structure	
The	organisational	structure	of	the	shipping	company	had	an	influence	on	the	performance	on	the	ship	
Organisational	
policies	
The	organisational	policies	of	the	shipping	company	had	an	influence	on	the	performance	on	the	ship		
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Table	22:	cont.	
Operations	 The	organisational	operations	of	the	shipping	company	had	an	influence	on	the	
performance	on	the	ship	
Procedures	 The	organisational	procedures	of	the	shipping	company	had	an	influence	on	the	performance	on	the	ship	
Supervision	 A	lack	of	supervision	had	a	negative	influence	on	shipboard	operations	
	
Manning/staffing	
characteristics	
	Manning	policies,	i.e.,	international	crewing,	had	an	influence	on	the	performance	of	the	individual	operators	on	board	the	vessel	
Time	pressure	 Pressure	to	meet	a	deadline	set	by	the	shipping	company	led	to	decreased	performance	by	the	operator	
Other	
Other	factors	 Any	other	factor	that	had	a	negative	influence	on	the	performance	of	the	operator		3.3	ERROR	RECOVERY	Looking	at	accident	models	it	becomes	clear	that	at	some	point	a	barrier	should	arise	to	prevent	the	incident	from	happening.	If	a	barrier	is	efficient	and	effective,	the	accident	can	be	prevented	and	it	will	cause	a	near-miss.	If	the	barriers	however	do	not	work	properly,	an	accident	will	ensue.	Hollnagel	(2004)	differentiates	between	physical,	functional,	symbolic	and	incorporeal	barriers	(tables	23,	24,	25	and	26).		3.3.1	PHYSICAL	BARRIERS	Physical	barriers	are	passive	barriers	that	fulfil	their	purpose	by	themselves	(table	23).	The	aim	of	physical	or	material	barriers	is	to	protect	by	blocking	or	mitigating	the	effects	of	an	action.	
Table	23:	Physical	barriers	
Physical	barrier	
Wall,	doors,	fences,	containers…	 Prevents	penetration	of	people	into	unsafe	areas	
Helmets,	safety	clothes,	gas	masks…	 Prevents	penetration	of	dangerous	material	into	the	human	body	
Safety	glass,	fire	safe	rooms,	fire	doors…	 Prevents	penetration	of	dangerous	material	into	a	place/space	3.3.2	FUNCTIONAL	BARRIERS	Functional	barrier	systems	 in	most	cases	only	work	 if	 they	are	combined	with	physical	barrier	systems	(table	24).	These	barriers	need	to	be	active	or	ready	in	order	to	work.	They	only	start	to	function	when	a	specific	condition	exists.		 	
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Table	24:	Functional	barriers	
Functional	barrier	
Locks,	physically	interlocking…	 Preventing	movement	or	action	concerning	“hardware”	
Passwords,	entry	codes,	action	sequences,	
pre-conditions…	
Preventing	movement	or	action	concerning	“software”	
Distance	(too	far	away	for	being	touched	
by	mistake),	persistence	(dead-man	
button)	…	
Hindering	or	impeding	actions	in	a	spatio-temporal	sense	
Sprinklers,	air	bags,	fire	extinguisher…	 Dissipating	energy,	quenching,	or	extinguishing	
	3.3.3	SYMBOLIC 	BARRIERS	A	symbolic	barrier	system	works	indirectly	through	its	meaning	and	hence	requires	an	act	of	interpretation	by	someone	(table	25).		
Table	25:	Symbolic	barriers	
Symbolic	barrier	
Demarcations,	labels,	warnings…	 Countering,	preventing	or	thwarting	actions	
Instructions,	procedures,	precautions,	
conditions,	dialogues	
Regulating	actions	
Signs,	signals,	warnings,	alarms…	 Indicating	system	status	or	conditions	
Clearance,	approval…	 Communication	and	interpersonal	dependency		3.3.4	INCORPOREAL	BARRIERS	An	incorporeal	barrier	system	lacks	material	form	or	substance	in	the	situations	where	it	is	applied	and	instead	depends	on	the	user	in	order	to	achieve	its	purpose	(table	26).		
Table	26:	Incorporeal	barriers	
Incorporeal	barrier	
Informal	guidance:	self-restraint,	ethical	
norms,	morals,	social	or	group	
pressure…	
Complying	with	or	conforming	to	these	rules	will	help	to	recover	from	an	accident	
Formal	guidance:	Rules,	restrictions,	
laws,	guidelines,	prohibitions,	training…	
Complying	with	or	conforming	to	these	rules	will	help	to	recover	from	an	accident		 	
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4. TRACER-MAR	COMMENTED	APPLICATION	EXAMPLE	In	 this	 section	 the	TRACEr-MAR	taxonomy	 is	applied	 to	an	accident	 reported	by	 the	Maritime	Accident	Investigation	Body	(MAIB)	of	the	UK.	In	the	summary	an	overall	sequence	of	the	accident	is	presented.		In	section	4.2	a	comprehensive	list	of	the	identified	task	errors	is	given	to	the	reader.	However,	for	the	purpose	of	 this	 Chapter,	 the	 TRACEr-MAR	 taxonomy	 is	 thoroughly	 applied	 only	 to	 the	 first	 two	 task	 errors,	respectively	in	section	4.2.1	and	4.2.2.	Tables	28	and	29	condensate	the	various	coding	in	accordance	to	the	taxonomy	 structure.	 For	 each	 code,	 a	 reference	 to	 the	original	 taxonomy	 is	made	on	 the	 extreme	 right	column.	A	brief	explanation	of	the	coding	rationale	is	given.		4.1	SUMMARY	At	0308	UTC	on	12	December	2012,	 the	dry	cargo	vessel	Beaumont	ran	aground	on	Cabo	Negro	on	the	north	 Spanish	 coast	while	 on	 passage	 from	 la	 Coruna	 to	 Avilés.	 At	 the	 time	 of	 the	 grounding	 she	was	proceeding	 at	 full	 speed,	 and	 the	 officer	 of	 the	watch	 (OOW)	was	 asleep.	 An	 inspection	 of	 the	 vessel’s	internal	compartment	quickly	established	that,	despite	being	driven	hard	aground	on	a	rocky	ledge,	there	was	no	breach	of	 the	hull.	The	MAIB	 investigation	 identified	 that	 the	OOW	had	 fallen	asleep	soon	after	sending	his	night	lookout	off	the	bridge.	Available	bridge	resources	that	could	have	alerted	the	crew	and/or	awoken	a	sleeping	OOW	were	not	used	resulting	in	Beaumont	steaming	at	11.5	knots	with	no-one	in	control	on	the	bridge	for	over	an	hour.		
Table	27	:	Identified	task	errors	
Report	Number	 14/2014	
Accident	Investigation	Body	 Marine	Accident	Investigation	Body	(MAIB)		
Date	of	the	accident	 12	December	2012	
Ship	Name	 Beaumont	
Ship	IMO	number	 9319416	
Flag	 UK	
Ship	Type	 General	cargo	
Port	of	Departure	 La	Coruna	
Port	of	Arrival	 Avilés	
Manning	 6	
Type	of	accident	 Grounding		
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4.2	IDENTIFIED	TASK	ERRORS	Following	a	thorough	analysis	of	the	investigation	report,	the	coder	identified	seven	main	tasks	error	which	are	set	out	in	table	27.	
Table	28	:	Identified	task	errors	
Task	Error	 Task	error	description	 Who?	 Where?	
1	 The	lookout	was	sent	away	 1st/Chief	Officer	 Bridge	
2	 1st	Officer	fell	asleep	on	the	bridge	 1st/Chief	Officer	 Bridge	
3	 ECS	volume	decreased	 1st/Chief	Officer	 Bridge	
4	 BNWAS	switched	off	 1st/Chief	Officer	 Bridge	
5	 Radar	guard	zone	absent	 1st/Chief	Officer	 Bridge	
6	 Echo	sounder	switched	off	 1st/Chief	Officer	 Bridge	
7	 The	master	did	not	insist	on	having	a	lookout	on	the	bridge	during	night	hours	 Captain	 Bridge			 	
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4.2.1	TASK	ERROR	1	–	THE	LOOKOUT	WAS	SENT	AWAY	BY 	THE	1ST 	OFFICER	As	mentioned	in	the	introduction	of	this	chapter,	only	the	first	two	task	errors	will	be	coded	following	the	TRACEr-Mar	taxonomy	(tables	28	and	29).	
Table	29:	Task	Error	1	
1st	Level	of	
Information	
2nd	Level	of	Information	 Coding	 Reference	
Task	error	 Task	error		 Supervision	 Table	1	
Error	Information	 Subtask	 Of	bridge	tasks	 Table	10	User	material	 No	technical	equipment	involved	 Table	7	Ship	fixed	info	 N/A	 Table	13	Ship	variable	info	 N/A	 Table	14	
Causality	level	 Causality	 Contributory	 Table	15	
Context	of	the	
operator	
External	error	mode	 Selection	and	quality	 Table	16	External	error	mode	 Wrong	action	on	right	object	 Table	16	Cognitive	domain	 Decision-making	 Section	3.2.2	Internal	error	mode	 Poor	decision	–	poor	planning	 Table	19	Psychological	error	mechanism	 Failure	to	consider	long-term	or	side	effects	 Table	21	
Performance	
shaping	factor	
Personal	factor	 Body	fatigue	 Table	22	Aspects	of	communication/information	 N/A	 Table	22	Training/competence/experience	 N/A	 Table	22	Internal/external	environment	 Time	of	day	(dark,	light)	 Table	23	Organisational	factor	 N/A	 Table	23	Other	 N/A	 Table	23	
Error	recovery	 Physical	barrier	not	successful	 N/A	 Table	24	Functional	barrier	not	successful	 N/A	 Table	25	Symbolic	barrier	not	successful	 Instructions,	procedures,	precautions,	dialogues	 Table	26	Incorporeal	barrier	not	successful	 Formal	guidance,	informal	guidance	 Table	27	
The	 action	 of	 sending	 away	 the	 lookout	 from	 the	 bridge	 during	 night	 hours	 was	 in	 contrast	 with	international	regulations,	however	could	not	be	considered	a	full	violation	since	it	was	not	required	by	the	company’s	safety	management	system.	The	coder	decided	to	assign	the	task	error	 ’supervision’	and	the	subtask	of	‘bridge	tasks’	for	this	particular	action.	No	user	material	or	ship	fixed	or	variable	information	were	involved	in	this	particular	task	error.		Following	the	guidelines	in	table	16,	the	EEM	coded	is	‘selection	and	quality’	and	specifically	‘wrong	action	on	right	object’	since	the	first	officer	dealt	with	the	lookout	(right	‘object’)	but	unfortunately	decided	on	an	erroneous	action	(sending	him	away	from	the	bridge).	Taking	into	account	 the	 internal	 cognitive	 process	 of	 the	 first	 officer,	 ‘decision-making’	 was	 chosen	 has	 the	 main	cognitive	domain	 for	 this	particular	 task	error	because	 following	 the	guidelines	 set	out	 in	 section	3.2.2	above,	‘the	user	received	the	crucial	information	and	processed	it	correctly,	but	came	to	a	wrong	conclusion	and	therefore	took	a	wrong	decision’.	By	following	this	train	of	thought,	the	IEM	was	identified	as	 ‘poor	decision	 –	 poor	 planning’	 and	 the	 PEM	 as	 ‘failure	 to	 consider	 long-term	or	 side	 effects’.	 The	main	 PSF	
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identified	 was	 the	 time	 of	 the	 day	 (dark),	 while	 error	 recovery	 was	 neither	 instructions,	 procedures,	precaution	nor	dialogues,	but	and	‘formal	Guidance,	informal	Guidance’	were	deemed	relevant.		4.2.2	TASK	ERROR	2	–	1ST 	OFFICER	FELL 	ASLEEP	ON	THE	BRIDGE	
Table	30:	Task	error	2	
1st	Level	of	
Information	
2nd	Level	of	Information	 Coding	 Reference	
Task	error	 Task	error		 Traffic	monitoring	&	watchkeeping	 Table	1	
Error	information	 Subtask	 Watchkeeping	 Table	10	User	material	 ECS	 Table	7	Ship	fixed	info	 N/A	 Table	13	Ship	variable	info	 N/A	 Table	14	
Causality	level	 Causality	 Causal	 Table	15	
Context	of	the	
operator	
External	error	mode	 Selection	and	quality	 Table	16	External	error	mode	 Omission	 Table	16	Cognitive	domain	 Perception	 Section	3.2.2	Internal	error	mode	 No	detection	 Table	18	Psychological	error	mechanism	 Vigilance	 Table	20	
Performance	
shaping	factor	
Personal	factor	 Body	fatigue	 Table	22	Aspects	of	communication/information	 N/A	 Table	22	Training/competence/experience	 N/A	 Table	22	Internal/external	environment	 Time	of	day	(dark,	light)	 Table	23	Organisational	factor	 Manning	 Table	23	Other	 N/A	 Table	23	
Error	Recovery	 Physical	barrier	not	successful	 N/A	 Table	24	Functional	barrier	not	successful	 Distance,	persistence,	dead-man	button,	alarms	 Table	25	Symbolic	barrier	not	successful	 -	Instructions,	procedures,	precautions,	dialogues	-	Signs,	signals,	warnings,	alarms	 Table	26	Incorporeal	barrier	not	successful	 Formal	guidance,	informal	guidance	 Table	27	
The	 first	 officer	 fell	 asleep	while	 on	watchkeeping	 duties.	 In	 this	 sense	 the	 task	 error	 coded	 is	 ‘traffic	monitoring	&	watchkeeping’	 and	 the	 subtask	 ‘watchkeeping”.	The	 equipment	 in	use	was	 the	 electronic	chart	 system	 for	 which	 the	 alarm	 was	 barely	 audible.	 Following	 the	 taxonomy,	 the	 EEM	 chosen	 was	‘omission’	since	the	operator	did	not	perform	any	action.	Since	the	ECS	alarm	was	not	heard,	the	cognitive	domain	identified	was	‘perception’,	and	the	IEM	as	‘no	detection’	and	the	PEM	as	‘vigilance’.	The	manning	level	and	the	time	of	the	day	(dark)	with	a	very	warm	environment	on	the	bridge	were	considered	by	the	coder	the	main	PSFs.	Further,	in	the	error	recovery	category,	neither	functional,	symbolic	nor	incorporeal	barriers	such	as	alarms,	instructions,	warnings,	signs,	dead-man	button,	distance,	and	formal	and	informal	guidance	managed	to	prevent	the	accident.	 	
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